The Emerging Arctic Security Environment

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Abstract

Climate change, undefined or disputed boundaries, access to resources and newly viable transportation routes and governance issues are generating significant questions about Arctic security and circumpolar geopolitics in the twenty-first century. Anticipating future prospects for competition, conflict and cooperation in the region requires a systematic examination of the new forces at play, both internationally and domestically. Our project examines fundamental questions including: What is Arctic security? What will the circumpolar world look like in the future, given the various forces transforming the region? Our project poses these questions at the international and national levels to discern what senior government officials, indigenous groups, corporate interests, scientists, academics, and Northern residents perceive to be the most significant security and safety challenges in the Arctic -- and to determine what unilateral, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms should be in place to address them. This project makes two primary contributions: one policy focused and the other academic. First, it adds to the public policy debate about the evolving Arctic security environment. Our research team critically assesses the interplay between traditional, state-based military security and environmental, health, and societal security concerns. In linking international and domestic security practices to human impacts, we are producing more integrated frameworks and tools to anticipate the consequences of security action/inaction on Northern ecosystems and peoples. This should help to enhance Canada’s capacity to deal with opportunities and challenges in a way that is sensitive to, and better integrates, Northerners’ concerns and priorities. Second, this project advances academic debates about the relationship between environmental, diplomatic, political, and socio-economic processes and ideas about Arctic security. Community consultations, participation in the Arctic Security Working Group, as well as partnerships with federal departments and agencies ground our analyses of how the changing geopolitics of the Arctic are influencing government policy and affecting Northerners’ culture, well-being, and economy. As a team, and in collaboration with our partners, we are refining existing frameworks and models to incorporate the complexity of these new forces, to better explain the actions that are now being taken, and to generate appropriate lessons for future relationship-building.

Key Messages

• The Arctic sovereignty and security environment continues to evolve in a complex manner, with official messages about peace and stability in the region competing with political statements about the need to assert control over and defend areas within national jurisdiction(s).

• Monitoring of Arctic state announcements, government implementation strategies, media commentary, and academic debate on Arctic defence, security, and sovereignty issues yields valuable insight into geostrategic and geopolitical shifts in the circumpolar Arctic. Transitional research designed to reach a policy audience helps to inform Canadian decision-makers about major defence, security, and political trends.

• This project tests important social scientific hypotheses regarding the probability and potential forms of cooperation and conflict between and within Arctic states (particularly Canada) through trend analysis, historical and contemporary case studies, and dialogues with policymakers and community stakeholders.

• This project also contributes to public debate about Arctic strategy, sovereignty, and security through frequent engagement with the national and international media, presentations to Canadian and international audiences, and papers and reports produced for various stakeholders.

• Given the central place of Arctic sovereignty and security in the Canadian Government’s Northern Strategy, assessing vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for enhanced security cooperation remains timely, relevant, and important to
ensuring that interactions between national defence, security, and safety priorities continue to be generally positive on local, regional, national, and international levels.

**Objectives**

- To continue to monitor and critically examine Arctic state practices in the defence, security, and safety spheres across the spectrum of “whole of government” relationships and activities.
- To continue to analyze evolving relationships between the Canadian Armed Forces, other federal government departments and agencies with security mandates, other Arctic and non-Arctic states, and Arctic peoples.
- To develop and enhance models that inform the framing and implementation of defence and security policies and that promote relationships that contribute to and support the interests of Canadians living in Arctic communities.
- To provide opportunities for emerging scholars to contribute to academic, policy, and public debates on the sovereignty, defence and security interests of Canada and the other Arctic states.
- To continue to critically examine the interests of non-Arctic actors in the region and how these interact with defence, sovereignty/territorial integrity, and security considerations.

**Introduction**

This project aims to better understand the developing Arctic security trends in the circumpolar region by critically analyzing the foreign, defence and security policies of Arctic states, and what ramifications these actions may have for the possibilities/probabilities of conflict and cooperation in the region.

The project also analyzes the relationship between sovereignty, security and safety in Canadian political discourse and policy. The traditional view of Arctic security is focused primarily on military defense and is habitually seen as distinct from local, Northern understandings of security that include economic and social concerns. Similarly, national discussions of “Arctic sovereignty” tend to focus on outstanding maritime boundary disputes and perceived foreign threats to Canada’s territorial integrity and control over resources. Northern perspectives emphasize that “sovereignty begins at home” – that sovereignty is better understood as the sum of all that goes on within Canada’s Arctic region. These two approaches are distinct but not necessarily contradictory. Our research seeks to bridge the gap between divergent ideas about security and sovereignty and translate them into concrete policy ideas.

The Government of Canada’s Northern Strategy (2009), Canadian Arctic Foreign Policy Statement (2010), and strategic and operational directives for the Canadian Armed Forces in Canada’s North reinforce the importance of an integrated, “whole-of-government” approach to achieve national goals and leverage military and civilian capabilities. In addition to fostering academic and public debate on defence and security issues, our research supports efforts to generate “lessons learned”/best practices, clarify capability gaps (actual and potential), identify opportunities for enhanced information sharing between departments and agencies (and across levels of government), and improve confidence-building measures. Our threat assessments confirm that there is no short-term military threat to the Canadian Arctic, but resource development, shipping, and natural hazards require that the Government prepare and practice responses to safety and security issues that are most likely to arise in the region.

**Activities**

During the last year, the network investigators, students, and research assistants have been actively engaged in ongoing information gathering, analysis, and dissemination of research results.
Lackenbauer, Huebert and Lalonde continue to serve as the three academic representatives in the Arctic Security Working Group (ASWG), a biannual forum co-chaired by Joint Task Force (North) and the northern regional office of Public Safety Canada in Yellowknife. The working group brings together officials from federal and territorial departments and agencies, Aboriginal leaders, and international partners to discuss sovereignty and security issues and to enhance information-sharing and cooperation. ASWG meetings provide Lackenbauer, Huebert and Lalonde with insight into government priorities, provide a forum for making contacts, and offer them an opportunity to share ArcticNet research findings and contribute to policy discussions.

Lackenbauer continued to conduct interviews with military officials and senior Arctic officials in Canada, the United States, and Europe. He has also enjoyed many informal meetings and discussions with Canadian Rangers pursuant to his ongoing research with that organization. He continues to advise the Canadian Armed Forces, federal departments, and other stakeholders on Arctic security issues, appeared on several radio programs, was frequently interviewed for newspaper and magazine articles about Northern sovereignty and security topics, and lectures frequently in Canada, the United States, and Europe on Canada’s Arctic strategy and related security issues. In the summer of 2013, he participated in the Students on Ice expedition to Greenland and Nunavut, which offered a unique opportunity to exchange knowledge on Arctic issues with high school students and expert staff. He was also invited by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development to deliver courses on Arctic Governance for foreign service officers and other federal officials, which drew heavily upon research facilitated by this ArcticNet grant.

Lalonde was asked to present Canada’s legal claims in the Arctic at two of the most prestigious annual international law meetings south of the border: in April, at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law held in Washington and in October, at the annual New York meeting of the International Law Association (ILA). While in New York, Lalonde was invited to sit in on a meeting of the ILA’s Baseline Committee which is currently looking at state practice around the world in respect of straight baselines (a report is expected in 2015). As a result of her participation at the New York meeting, Lalonde was asked by the Committee president and Special Rapporteur to join the Committee as the Canadian representative. She also conducted interviews with military officials and personnel at the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal for an academic paper on the international legal framework governing aircraft in the Arctic region. She was interviewed by French radio media and participated in the popular scientific series Découverte on Radio-Canada. She also devoted considerable time to editing 18 chapters as well as penning her own for the forthcoming book The Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honour of Donat Pharand, which she is co-editing with Ted McDorman (an ArcticNet member with the Law and Politics of Canadian Jurisdiction on Arctic Ocean Seabed<http://www.arcticnet.ulaval.ca/research/summary.php?project_id=46> project) for a leading international publisher. The book brings together some of the world’s top Arctic experts, among them an ad hoc judge of the International Court of Justice, a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and a member of the International Law Commission. Lalonde’s role as principal editor has enabled her to forge new links with key participants in the international dialogue on the future of the Arctic region.

Huebert has advised and continues to provide advice to the Canadian Armed Forces and various federal departments as well as senior government officials on Arctic security issues. He is a frequent commentator in both national and international media and is very frequently interviewed for newspaper and magazine articles about Northern sovereignty and security topics. He has also provided a number of op-eds on issues of Arctic security to national newspapers including the Globe and Mail, National Post and the Washington Post. He has also participated as an expert guest on several international documentaries on the changing security realities in the Arctic.
ArcticNet travel support also facilitated postdoctoral and graduate student research and conference travel in Canada, Europe, and Asia. For example, Heather Exner-Pirot attended the Arctic Circle meeting in Reykjavik from 12-14 October 2013, where she launched the 2013 Arctic Yearbook at an event hosted by the Canadian Embassy. Mitchell Patterson undertook field research with the Canadian Rangers from coastal communities in northern Ontario and plans to do the same with Rangers in the Northwest Territories and/or Nunavut this winter. He also presented posters at two conferences, including the Arcticnet meeting in Halifax. James Manicom has leveraged ArcticNet funding to support trips to China and Japan, where he continues to interview government, academic, and industry stakeholders on Arctic issues.

Our collaborative information gathering process has proved highly effective and efficient in the past year. Students, postdoctoral fellows, and research assistants have continued to consult and digitize relevant archival document holdings in North America and the United Kingdom. For example, Daniel Heidt and Adam Lajeunesse have conducted archival research on Arctic security issues in Ottawa (Library and Archives Canada, Department of National Defence) and Winnipeg (Library and Archives Canada regional office), and Peter Kikkert in Yellowknife (Prince of Wales Northern Heritage Centre/NWT Archives). Lackenbauer and senior graduate students have also mentored younger graduate students and undergraduate research assistants in advanced archival research techniques, including use of finding aids, processing of digitized documents, and indexing. Furthermore, students and research assistants have also undertaken systematic research on Canadian and international newspaper coverage related to Arctic sovereignty and security issues. This has been used in conference papers and public lectures, theses/dissertations, scholarly articles and books-in-progress, newspaper and magazine articles, and policy recommendations to government officials.

**Project Milestones**

- Edited manuscript (Lackenbauer) based upon Gordon W. Smith’s A Historical and Legal Study of Sovereignty in the Canadian North, 1870-1939 (forthcoming, University of Calgary Press, spring 2014, and recipient of a Federation of Humanities and Social Science’s Awards to Scholar Publishing Program grant).
- Working Papers on Arctic Security (series editor, Lackenbauer), supported by this ArcticNet project and the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation Arctic Security Project:
  1. Negotiating Sovereignty: The Past and Present Failure of ‘Security’ as a Bargaining Chip (Lajeunesse)
  2. If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Break It: Expanding and Enhancing the Canadian Rangers (Lackenbauer)
  3. A Circumpolar Convergence: Canada, Russia, the Arctic Council and RAIPON (Dean and Ron Wallace)
  4. Rethinking Westphalian Sovereignty: The Inuit Circumpolar Council and the Future of Arctic Governance (Shadian)
  5. Autopsie de la fin d’une décennie turbulente en Arctique : discours gouvernemental, médiatique et inuit sur la sécurité arctique entre 2008 et 2010 au Canada (Landriault)
6. Canadian Arctic Defence Policy: A Synthesis of Key Documents, 1970-2012 (Dean, Lackenbauer, Lajeunesse)

- Policy briefs, background papers, articles and book chapters, and a book-in-progress on Asian interests in the Arctic and how these intersect with Canadian interests and priorities.
- Dissemination of research findings at Canadian and international conferences, workshops, government meetings, advisory boards, and stakeholder gatherings.
- Ongoing publication of scholarly articles and book chapters, as well as op-eds and shorter policy examinations for various working paper series, newspapers and magazines.

Results

The Arctic sovereignty and security environment continues to evolve in a complex manner, with official messages about peace and stability in the region competing with political statements about the need to defend and assert control over areas under national jurisdiction. Researchers still disagree on the nature of the Arctic geopolitical security environment -- even though they agree that Canada must develop readiness and capacity to meet future challenges across a broad spectrum of defence, security, and safety threats. Huebert leads a school of thought that continues to prioritize threats to Canadian sovereignty and security, suggesting that new dynamics in the circumpolar world (and beyond) necessitate investments in enhanced defence capabilities, a stronger military presence, and greater situational awareness in the region. Lackenbauer and other members of our research team emphasize stability, peaceful dialogue, and mutual interests amongst Arctic states as the main trends in circumpolar relations. They prioritize international relationships and institutions as conduits for Canada to realize its national interests while respecting those of other Arctic states (and, increasingly, the interests of non-Arctic states). Their justification for Canadian investments in defence and security places a higher emphasis on enhanced capabilities in a whole of government context to respond to safety and security challenges. Lalonde focuses on international legal mechanisms that Canada can use to safeguard its Arctic interests, such as uti possidetis and the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs).

The International Dimension

Members of the research team remain actively engaged in public debates about strategic developments in the Arctic region, disseminating research findings and opinions through newspaper and online editorials, television and radio interviews. Huebert insists that Arctic militarization demands close political attention and investments in enhanced defence capabilities (“Canada has to walk its Arctic Talk,” Globe and Mail August 13, 2013; Huebert, “Its time to talk about Arctic Militarization,” National Post May 6, 2013). By contrast, Lackenbauer emphasizes a positive evolution in government policy from a narrow fixation on sovereignty and traditional security to a whole-of-government strategy that also highlights human capacity-building and responsible development (eg. Globe and Mail, 20 August 2013) – a message he has delivered to various North American and European audiences. Exner-Pirot is more deliberate in her critiques of political statements, arguing (with Joël Plouffe) that the “PM risks isolation with imaginary Arctic threats” (Globe and Mail, 23 January 2014).

The “globalization” of Arctic issues continues to generate new opportunities and concerns for Arctic states and Northern peoples, reaffirming that Arctic affairs are no longer the quiet preserve of the Arctic states. The Arctic Council, a relaxed forum for dialogue and information sharing amongst Arctic states and representatives of indigenous groups (the permanent participants), has faced a deluge of new applicants for observer status in recent years: China, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Mongolia have joined with the European Union, Italy and various non-governmental organizations.
in seeking a more permanent place in the Council. The eight ministers from the Arctic states voted to accept the submissions of the non-Arctic states (with qualifications in the case of the EU) at the Council Ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in May 2013. With increased non-Arctic state pressure for access to circumpolar discussions, however, questions remain as to whether the existing suite of Arctic governance institutions is sufficiently robust and inclusive to deal with regional challenges in the twenty-first century.

Accepting new observers is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. The real challenge will come in maintaining the current structure of the Council as new actors clamour for a say in scientific research, resource development, regional governance and transportation more generally. The extent to which Arctic and Asian states’ interests currently conflict on Arctic issues is overblown in most popular media and scholarly accounts. Nevertheless, some Chinese commentators have indicated that they consider observer status as a foot in the door to leverage greater influence over time. Indian scholars, their ideas framed by a long history of Antarctic engagement, still conjure visions of an Arctic treaty system that would resemble the international regime governing the south polar continent. This overlooks the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Arctic states, as well as perceptions of appropriate regional governance encapsulated in their national strategies and the Ilulissat declaration of May 2008. In policy-oriented briefs and papers, Lackenbauer and Manicom suggest that non-Arctic states have legitimate interests in and can make substantive contributions to the region -- as long as they respect the Arctic states’ sovereignty and sovereign rights to exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and extended continental shelves as scripted in international law.

With most Arctic state commentary fixated on China’s Arctic interests (eg. Jakobson and Peng, 2012), other non-Arctic states and organizations are expressing heightened interest in circumpolar affairs. For example, Indian commentators have hailed their country’s successful application for observer status at the Arctic Council (approved by the Arctic member states at the Kiruna ministerial meeting in May 2013) as an “Arctic victory” and “a major diplomatic achievement” for foreign minister Salman Khursid. Most Indian commentators agree that responsible environmental management and cooperative scientific research and exploration are essential to any Arctic governance regime. What do they mean when they refer to the Arctic as a “global commons”? How do they interpret the relevance of scientific research in the region, Arctic resource assessments, and prospects for investments or new technological capabilities to exploit these resources? How does China’s growing interest in the Arctic, and the most basic question of prestige, factor into India’s Arctic outlook? Lackenbauer’s chapter in the 2013 Arctic Yearbook critically examines the writings of five Indian commentators and how they situate Arctic issues in a global perspective (rather than the national or regional perspective that dominates most commentaries emanating from the Arctic states). For Arctic scholars and policy-makers to better understand what appear to be peculiar and even confrontational positions on regional issues, Lackenbauer encourages them to look to India’s experiences in Antarctica and Svalbard, its broader geostrategic interests, and the corresponding frames that Indian thinkers apply to geopolitics and governance in the Arctic.

Building conceptual tools to better understand Arctic governance issues, Exner-Pirot’s work this past year has focused on the Arctic as a geopolitical region (its principal actors, their behavior, their shared and competing values, and regional (in) cohesions). Her main findings suggest that the Arctic has evolved into a much more identifiable “region” as defined by the coalescing of common interests, values and activities, to the exclusion of other states (eg. Canadian and Russian interests delaying the application of the European Union for observer status at the Arctic Council). She observed that the Arctic states act much like a Regional Security Complex founded on environmental security interests. Her work also explored Canada’s long history of prioritizing northern regional development and indigenous self-determination, which peaked during Arctic Council
negotiations in the early 1990s. For this reason, Canada pushed for the inclusion of a sustainable development mandate and Permanent Participants in the Council’s founding Declaration. While the Arctic Council has focused on environmental protection initiatives over the past sixteen years, Canada is using its chairmanship of the Arctic Council (and the appointment of Cabinet Minister Leona Aglukkaq as Chair) to put local development back in focus. Exner-Pirot argues, however, that the Harper government should critically ask whether it has the soft power and moral leadership needed to re-orient the Council in the wake of what international commentators view as belligerent rhetoric and the Canadian government’s poor performance in global climate change mitigation efforts.

Will Greaves’ comparative research on Arctic security in Canada, Norway, and Russia, examines both changing sovereign understandings of Arctic security as articulated in the official policies of circumpolar states and the understandings of sub-state Indigenous actors. His work makes theoretical contributions to the literature on ‘securitization’, the process by which security threats are socially constructed between different socio-political actors. Analysis of official and unofficial efforts to securitize different aspects of the circumpolar Arctic offers insight into the nature of ‘security’; the policy influence of non-state securitizing moves; and the relationship between non-dominant social groups and securitization of particular policy issues. Along similar lines, Ryan Dean’s coauthored chapter with Tom Axworthy (2013) explored how Canada’s indigenous leaders shaped the Arctic Council from 1987-97. Aboriginal leaders such as Mary Simon, supported by private foundations, became the advocates of a unique international forum that gave unprecedented status to Indigenous representatives to sit at the same table as foreign ministers through the innovation of a Permanent Participant category. The Russian Federation’s suspension of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and alleged political interference in this permanent participant’s leadership selection process (Dean and Wallace, 2013), however, shows ongoing tensions between Russian human rights/values, trade interests, and the interface between domestic, circumpolar, and broader international affairs.

Research findings also reinforce the intersection between security relationships and international law. Lalonde is the principal editor, along with Ted McDorman, of a volume of 18 essays by leading Arctic experts to be published in the first half of 2014 by Brill/Martinus Nijhoff USA. The first section of the volume will contain papers (one third of the contributions) that focus on historical, geographical and geopolitical issues affecting the Arctic. The second section of the volume (two thirds of the papers), will focus on law of the sea and related issues of current importance for the Arctic region. In both sections, the majority of the papers will be penned by Canadian experts, but there will be significant participation by non-Canadian academics as well. To enhance the relevance and usefulness of the book, contributors have been asked to target specific topics of importance to policy-makers, international lawyers and other researchers in contrast to more sweeping, general articles on larger issues that reiterate the well-known. Some of the topics investigated include the need to formalize the Arctic Council through the adoption of a treaty, the role of the sector principle in resolving boundary disputes, the legal status of various information Arctic platforms, assessments and monitoring programs, the growing importance of the Bering Strait as a critical geographic choke-point and alternative strategies for navigating the CLCS process where an overlap or dispute exists. The volume will thus be a major work on the current and future international legal issues that an expanded use of the Arctic Ocean will raise.

The festschrift also looks backward to inform current debates. For example, Lackenbauer and Kikkert’s chapter re-evaluates bilateral relations over the “sector” approach to dividing the Arctic using straight lines to the North Pole from 1924-55. Although most Canadian officials realized that the sector principle was legally indefensible, and understood the need for effective occupation in the Arctic, the sector served a political purpose by setting constraints on potential
US claims to undiscovered islands. The Americans privately noted their disagreement with Canada’s Arctic claims and its use of the principle in the 1920s and 1930s, but they chose not to jeopardize their relationship with their northern neighbour over polar sovereignty. After the Second World War, the U.S. maintained a balanced course that upheld its broader political and strategic relationship with Canada without setting legal precedents that would have jeopardized the American legal position vis-à-vis the Antarctic and Arctic Russia. Lackenbauer and Kikkert (2014) argue that the U.S. carefully maintained an effective defence of legal position that avoided a Pyrrhic victory while ensuring access to the Canadian Arctic which it considered essential to continental defense and security. As the Cold War started, it quietly and privately conceded to Canada what it was not prepared to acknowledge in international law: a relaxed interpretation of effective occupation and ownership of uninhabited territories in polar regions. This resonates with arguments that Canada and the United States have a longstanding tradition of “agreeing to disagree” on legal status without undermining practical action.

The Domestic Dimension

Our project also contributes to debates and discussions about appropriate roles for the Department of National Defence /Canadian Armed Forces and other government departments and agencies in an integrated, comprehensive approach to Arctic security. Responding to hazards such as pandemics, environmental or transportation disasters, and search and rescue in the Arctic often entails a military contribution given available resources. Due to the limited response capability of other government departments, the Canadian Armed Forces must be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in non-defence related emergencies when requested by other government departments and agencies. At the request of the co-chairs of the Arctic Security Working Group (ASWG), members of the research team have gathered and began to:

• analyze “lessons learned” from whole-of-government exercises during Operation Nanook,
• present preliminary assessments on the achievements of the ASWG since 1999, and
• initiate discussions with government stakeholders about possibilities for improved cooperation, coordination, and interoperability between government and community partners.

Key themes emerging from our research include the importance of building local capacity without unnecessarily burdening Northern communities; the imperative of ongoing, substantive dialogue to set priorities and explain policies and practices; sensitivities about government departments encroaching on others’ mandates; and managing expectations so that future relationships and operations are not “set up to fail.”

Lackenbauer’s ongoing historical work on Canadian sovereignty and security practices emphasizes how the past is relevant to understanding the perils facing the region today and into the future. Throughout the last century, southern engagement with the North ebbed and flowed with little consideration of the impact this interaction had on Northerners, their culture and their landscape. From the Second World War notion of the Arctic as an exposed front, to the Cold War concept of the North as a vast buffer zone, perceptions of the Arctic changed with the nature of the perceived security or sovereignty crisis and the government scrambled to intervene to suit short-term political imperatives. The movement of a U.S. oil tanker through the passage in 1969 rekindled sovereignty fears, but also coalesced with a nascent environmentalism, which had the media now pitching a “delicate arctic” in need of protection. A similar U.S. incident in 1985 had the Conservative government of the time even talking about buying a fleet of nuclear submarines. Needless to say the crisis passed, and with it the submarine plans. This reflected the episodic, “crisis-reaction-apathy” tendency in Canadian Arctic policy (Huebert; Griffiths; Coates et al. 2008).

Although Canadian decision-makers and the southern public tend to forget the Arctic once sovereignty crises abate, Northerners do not have that luxury.
Historical trends show past perceptions of external crises were catalysts for state action. Because crises demand action rather than dialogues, Northerners’ interests and priorities are often overlooked. The security discourse began to be disrupted in the 1970s, with ground-breaking reports like Justice Thomas Berger’s Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland speaking to the impact of northern development on northern peoples, and scholars like Nils Orvik began to broaden the definition of security and sovereignty to accommodate northern peoples’ interests and values. The old model - state-centered and focused almost entirely on the military - was no longer suitable. More importantly, northern peoples spoke up for themselves and encouraged governments to start taking aboriginal concerns into account. Indigenous leaders such as George Erasmus and Mary Simon began speaking out for environmental, economic and cultural security, expanding the debate - and the meaning – of security. Lackenbauer’s work highlights why Northerners should have a say in northern strategy as the people most directly affected by it.

Lackenbauer’s ongoing research and outreach work associated with the Canadian Rangers, members of the Canadian Forces who live and serve in isolated northern and coastal communities across Canada, reinforces the importance of positive relationships rooted in mutual respect and trust. Lackenbauer contends that the Rangers are a great success story because they embody the spirit of an ongoing dialogue between the military and Northerners, as well as acting as a visible symbol of sovereignty by providing “mukluks on the ground.” His book, The Canadian Rangers: A Living History (2013), explores the complex history between these citizen-soldiers and the military. In the end, he urges caution so that current efforts to “enhance” and “expand” the Rangers do not undermine the culture and relationships that have evolved over past decades, insisting that “if it ain’t broken, don’t break it” (the title of his Arctic Security working paper on the topic). The Rangers serve as a positive model of how a military presence, training, and operations in the North can have enduring, constructive socioeconomic, political, and cultural effects at the local level.

Other aspects of our research program interrogate the military’s evolving contributions to Arctic security and sovereignty. Lajeunesse’s recently completed monograph, Lock, Stock and Icebergs: The Evolution of Canada’s Arctic Maritime Sovereignty (submitted to UBC Press), analyzes the development of national jurisdiction and governance since the nineteenth century through changes to international maritime law in the polar regions, bilateral law of the sea relations between Canada and the United States, and security threats to and from the High North. His work affirms that Canadian policy was developed in a coherent and rational manner by the government bureaucracy (eg. Kikkert and Lackenbauer, 2013) but he concludes that it was expressed so poorly in public statements that the messaging confused rather than clarified Canada’s jurisdictional claims. This regrettable lack of clarity was only rectified in the 1970s after a fundamental reevaluation caused by the voyage of the SS Manhattan. Canada avoided any direct challenges to its claim by forging friendly and informal accommodations with the United States. These unspoken arrangements, which stretched from the 1940 to the end of the Cold War, avoided the question of sovereignty and allowed both parties to balance questions of sovereignty and security. This important empirical study informs the ongoing debate between scholars who perceive Canadian sovereignty loss owing to Cold War continental security relationships (eg. Grant, 1988, 2011), and those who see Canada upholding both its sovereignty and security interests in its arrangements with the United States (Coates et al. 2008).

The Canadian Forces, however, are not the only branch of the government that safeguards Arctic security. The Canadian Armed Forces ‘lead from behind’ in the Arctic; they are willing to contribute their unique transportation and communications capabilities to facilitate Arctic security, but they allow other agencies and groups to direct Arctic activities. Although the terminology has changed, this attitude is not new. Lackenbauer and Daniel Heidt’s forthcoming history of the Joint Arctic Weather Stations (JAWS) documents that this predilection is
nothing new. Beginning in 1947, a combination of civilian and military requirements for better Arctic meteorological data led the Canadian and American Forces to contribute to the establishment and resupply of the stations. Yet the JAWS network was managed and operated by the Department of Transport and United States Weather Bureau. Over the next quarter century, these stations contributed to Arctic security by providing reliable meteorological data that facilitated safe passage through the region. They also contributed to the region’s security by serving as transportation and communication hubs for search and rescue missions, the Polar Continental Shelf Project, and other short-term research programs. Civilian science, in short, played a foundational role in the development of Canadian Arctic security infrastructure, from major facilities at Alert and Resolute to more austere footprints at Eureka, Isachsen, and Mould Bay. In complementary research but in the present context, Mitchell Patterson presented preliminary ideas about how military personnel, civilian scientists, and indigenous peoples contribute to the collection of terrestrial and oceanographic data to support their respective Arctic security agendas. Collectively, our research team’s insights reinforce the importance of leveraging civilian and military infrastructure investments (as was recently done with the joint expansion of the PCSP facility and establishment of the Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre at Resolute) when implementing a “hub-and-spoke” plan for operations in the Far North.

Other team members are exploring the influence of non-military actors on Canadian Arctic security. Landriault’s recently completed doctoral research on “securitization” during the first decade of the twenty-first century provides systematic, empirical evidence to demonstrate how and when the government and media identified and constructed sovereignty “crises” (eg. Lackenbauer (2009 – CIC). Landriault also reveals the Inuit focus on climate change and its effects on local economic and cultural security – a discourse, he laments, that failed to find strong traction in government discourse through to 2010. Greaves’s research echoes these findings. In his publications exploring tensions between ‘Arctic security’ and ‘energy security’ in Canada, he points out that the Canadian government is increasingly focused on resource extraction and cultivating business relationships at the expense of environmental protection. This strategy has marginalized Indigenous groups’ concerns regarding the exacerbation of environmental insecurities. Warm and erratic weather is thinning the ice and making treks across the Arctic increasingly treacherous. Coastal erosion and melting permafrost are forcing communities to relocate and reducing the quality and quantity of traditional food sources. The Canadian government and business interests, he concludes, are not pursuing sustainable development policies. Preliminary research findings also support his contention that Arctic security-as-energy security differs significantly from the general understanding of Arctic Indigenous peoples of security-as-environmental protection, cultural preservation, and political autonomy. Lajeunesse, who secured postdoctoral funding to complete a monograph on oil and gas development in the Canadian Arctic from 1950 to the present, identifies similar themes when exploring the influence of industry on policy development.

In addition to published contributions, ArcticNet funding facilitated a wide array of conference papers, public lectures, and meetings with government decision-makers in 2013-14. For example, presentations included:


Lalonde, Suzanne. Leader of a session on the Northwest Passage in the context of a course prepared and delivered by Whitney Lackenbauer. The Canadian Institute of Foreign Service, 16 December 2013.


Lackenbauer, Whitney. “Arctic Sovereignty, Security and Insecurity: A Canadian Perspective.” Austrian Polar Research Institute, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria, 5 December 2013. At the invitation of the Canadian Embassy in Austria.

Lackenbauer, Whitney. “Strategische Herausforderungen Arctic Sea.” Sicherheitspolitik und Verteidigungsindustrie: Handelsblatt Konferenz, Berlin, Germany, 4 December 2013. At the invitation of the Canadian Embassy in Germany.


Lackenbauer, Whitney. “Climate Change and the Strategic Future of the Arctic: A Canadian


Lalonde, Suzanne. “Navigating the Seas of Change – Challenges to Arctic Shipping.” Women’s International Shipping and Trading Association (WISTA) conference, Montreal, Canada, 4 September 2013.


Lackenbauer, Whitney. “The CF and Canada’s Strategic North: Misconceptions, Constraints, and Opportunities,” lecture to Joint Command and Staff Program, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 2 May 2013.


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Discussion

The emerging Arctic regime displays a complexity that belies many popular assumptions and requires new analytical tools to understand its dynamic nature. The Arctic states have invested considerable time and energy in more robust security policies and capabilities. At the same time, new actors have entered the region, generating uncertainty, concern, as well as opportunities. As a result, Canadian policymakers must respond to an increasingly wide range of pressures and challenges in balancing local/regional, national, circumpolar, and global interests.

The Arctic is a truly unique operating environment with varied conditions depending on the season and geographical region. Defence and security agencies face operational challenges posed by vast distances from southern population centres (and main military support bases), remoteness and isolation, minimal infrastructure, and communication challenges. Accordingly, the Canadian Armed Forces treat the North as “an expeditionary type theatre,” meaning that forces need to be specially equipped and trained, deployable, and self-sufficient (to ensure that they do not drain vital resources from Northern communities).

In the four pillars of Canada’s Northern Strategy, traditional concepts of sovereignty (the internationally recognized right to control activities in national jurisdiction) and security (the ability to defend and maintain core national interests and values against threats posed by outside actors) have their place alongside environmental protection, sustainable development, and stronger Northern governance. Despite the emphasis on Arctic defence from 2006-08, the days of military projects leading the Northern development charge are long past. The Canadian Armed Forces will continue to support nation-building, but the civilian public and private sectors now play the central role in facilitating sustainable development. The Canadian Coast Guard, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and other government departments have foremost responsibility for dealing with law enforcement and security issues in the region but, when emergencies arise, the military must be prepared to play what is technically a supporting role. In practice, it will have to “lead from behind.”

A comprehensive approach to Arctic security necessitates integrated efforts between federal, provincial, territorial, and Aboriginal governments, industry, and communities. Practical models and practices that support better synchronization of planning and infrastructure investments should produce more effective, timely, and collective responses to crises and emergencies. Our research has identified the need for more academic engagement with defence and security decision-makers to identify options for improved cross-sectoral collaboration, information sharing, and leveraging resources.

Although civilian departments and agencies have assumed control of most communication and transportation facilities in the North, the military’s historic footprints are still everywhere. “The Military as Nation-Builder: The Case of the Canadian North,” Lackenbauer’s 2013 Ross Ellis Memorial lecture delivered at the University of Calgary, charts a long-term pattern of positive military contributions to Northern life: improved communications, transportation, training, and community-development that have contributed to broader nation-building objectives. Our findings anticipate that this will continue in modest form. The Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre, co-located with the Polar Continental Shelf Program in Resolute, is a prime example of how defence investments can be leveraged for civilian benefit – and vice versa. When developments do not bring obvious community benefits (like the decision to refurbish the dock at Nanisivik as a berthing and refuelling facility rather than building a port at Iqaluit) resentment now runs deep. Whether deploying satellites or contracting civilian airlift, opportunities for public-private partnerships remain. Our research indicates an absence of academic literature on these opportunities in a Northern defence and security context.
In keeping with the spirit of Canada’s Northern strategy, all government activities must be conducted with a central emphasis on the interests and priorities of Northerners. Results of ongoing conversations with Northern representatives confirm that this includes, from the onset, meaningful consultation and engagement with Aboriginal government bodies and other representatives. By deriving lessons learned and best practices from in-depth analysis of past and present interactions, decision-makers can develop and nurture positive relations (like that between the military, the Canadian Rangers, and their host communities) that balance sovereignty, security, and stewardship responsibilities in the twenty-first century Arctic.

As part of its obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention, Canada is required to submit its scientific dossier supporting its claim to an extended continental shelf. This is a necessary precondition to clarifying its sovereign rights and the attendant security and stewardship responsibilities. Political attention around Canada’s deferred submission of its claim to the extended continental shelf in the Arctic in December 2013, and the reaction from the Russian Federation, confirms the geopolitical and geostrategic interests at play in the region. In an editorial in the Washington Post summarizing his Arcticnet research findings (“5 myths about the North Pole,” 20 December 2013), Huebert addressed what he sees as the biggest misconceptions about Arctic geopolitics:

- Myth: The North Pole is just like the South Pole. The rules, laws and practices defining the areas are poles apart. For example, the South Pole is governed by a treaty outlining what can be done there (mainly scientific research) and what cannot (resource development and military functions). Activity at the North Pole follows maritime treaties and international law. In other words, anything that can be done in any other ocean can take place at the North Pole. The South Pole cannot be claimed by any one state. But almost all of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean, including the region surrounding the North Pole, can be.

- Myth: Canada, Russia and Denmark are each attempting a North Pole “land” grab. Recent news reports suggest that the governments of Canada and Russia are vying for control of the region, as when much of Africa was divided up by colonial powers. Canada’s and Russia’s efforts to determine their rights over the North Pole’s soil and subsurface, however, are part of a well-established international process. Under the terms of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), both states have the right to resources such as oil, gas, minerals and anything else that exists on the bottom of the ocean more than 200 nautical miles off their coasts. States have the right to determine if they have an extended continental shelf, which is a natural extension of the underwater landmass. They must conduct thorough measurements (no easy task in the Arctic) and then give their findings to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to verify their science. It remains up to the states involved to resolve any overlaps. So far, Russia, Canada and Denmark are proceeding as the rules prescribe, and there is no reason to expect conflict.

- Myth: There is no international law governing the North Pole. The waters at and surrounding the North Pole are governed by the same international laws that apply to all other oceans. As the ice there begins to melt, the water above the seabed will remain international waters. If, as the sea warms, new stocks of fish and marine mammals move to the waters in and around the North Pole, then international fishing fleets will have the right to pursue them. In general, the collapse of world fishing stocks is blamed on the weakness of existing rules, including the enforcement of fishing limits and faulty reporting of fishing stocks. Thus, those problems could be exported to the waters of the North Pole and become major international challenges.

- Myth: There is no military presence at the North Pole. While there is no real threat of conflict over the division of the seabed, there still is military
activity in the region (Huebert et al., 2012). As the ice melts and the Arctic Ocean becomes similar to the other oceans, day-to-day naval activities for the protection of maritime trade are likely to occur there. Huebert suggests that there are two trends increasing the strategic importance of the waters around the North Pole. First, Russia has been building improved submarines to carry nuclear missiles. The key bases for these submarines and protective forces are in and around Murmansk, facing directly toward the North Pole. This has already caused the U.S. Navy to ensure that its attack submarines are capable of operating in Arctic waters (US Navy, 2009; US DoD, 2013) and may reintroduce the under-the-ice ‘cat and mouse’ games of the Cold War era. Second, whenever the United States feels threatened by North Korea, it strengthens its anti-ballistic missile systems — and the primary land-based interceptor site is at Fort Greely, Alaska. Its interceptor aircraft are not based in the Arctic because of any U.S. concern about a missile strike from its Arctic neighbors. But their location has not gone unnoticed by Russian authorities, who think U.S. efforts may be directed against them (not rogue states or non-state actors). Accordingly, the presence of U.S. and Russian military forces in the Arctic means that in times of conflict and stress in other parts of the world, the Arctic may be drawn in as a theatre of deployment and thus of strategic importance.

• Myth: The only thing changing at the North Pole is the climate. The most dramatic changes in the region are related to the climate. At the same time the North Pole is physically changing, exploration of the area is increasing. Improvements in marine technology — led by non-Arctic states such as South Korea — are allowing different types of vessels to enter the region, even in the presence of ice. The ongoing discovery of untapped oil and gas fields in the area is also driving the development of better technologies. Members of the research team remain divided on the prospects of transit shipping and offshore resource development in the North American Arctic.

While there are promising signs of international cooperation (emphasized by Lackenbauer and Exner-Pirot, for example), problems with fishing and increased submarine activities could soon emerge (Huebert and Lalonde). All of the team members agree, however, that the Arctic basin is in a state of massive transformation.

The emergence of new actors on the Arctic scene has further complicated security and governance models. Organizations such as Greenpeace, which has physically occupied drilling rigs in Greenlandic and Russian Arctic waters, play a controversial and even confrontational role in the region. Furthermore, growing Asian state interest in Arctic science, resource development, shipping, and boundary questions has promoted a reconsideration and rearticulation of Arctic security in global rather than regional terms. The successful efforts of China, Japan, India, South Korea and Singapore (along with Italy) to become observers at the Arctic Council highlights that the Arctic states and permanent participants consider them legitimate stakeholders. To secure this status, however, they had to acknowledge Arctic states’ sovereignty and sovereign rights, declare their respect for indigenous cultures, and support the Council’s original objectives as a high-level forum to promote “co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States … on common Arctic issues.” Does this reality accommodate non-Arctic states’ rising ambitions and perceived “rights” in regional affairs? Lackenbauer and Manicom contend that, during its chair, Canada must look at the region through global, regional and national lenses to ensure that its interests, those of the Council, and those of a growing array of interested stakeholders are balanced and maintained.

Both the localization and globalization of Arctic issues have led some scholars to broaden and deepen the concept of security – a concept that remains contested in the Arctic context (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2013; Inuit Qaujisarvingat and Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, 2013). Accordingly, individual research
projects continue to inform our development of an improved academic model of securitization theory. First developed by the so-called “Copenhagen School” in the 1990s, the theory posits that a security issue is produced after a securitizing actor presents it as an existential threat and convinces the “audience” that this is the case. The “pioneers” of this approach, Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde (1998: 36), identify three units of analysis: the referent object (the object of securitization); the security actor (actors who declare a referent object to be existentially threatened); and functional actors (actors who significantly influence decisions in the security sector). Building on Thierry Balzacq (2011), we agree that audiences and context are also essential units of analysis to understand the practices and methods that produce security.

Debates about the Copenhagen School’s approach have produced significant differences within the field. Poststructuralists like Ole Waever suggest that security problems are produced through the speech act labelling them “security” issues. (Waever 1995: 55) This process of naming something a security threat is not merely constative – reporting on an objective state of affairs – but performative in itself. Balzacq (2011: 1-2) distinguishes between this philosophical variant (which “ultimately reduces security to a conventional procedure” in which success is measured by the speech act itself) and a sociological view of securitization “as a strategic (pragmatic) process that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.” In short, scholars with a sociological orientation analyze securitization in terms of the broader practices, context, and power relations that produce or justify certain threat images.

Our research team employs aspects of both models: the theoretical to help explain the creation of security threats, and the sociological model to understand the construction of threats as pragmatic practice to attain political or policy goals. Our work finds that although the language of security and sovereignty are often intertwined in recent discourse, there is a salient distinction between the two concepts. In Canada, external actors – particularly the United States – have been conceptualized as threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, but not as security threats. For analytical purposes, the logic of securitization theory (moves, actors, context, and audience) also applies to the production of sovereignty threats. Accordingly, Lackenbauer is developing and testing a parallel model of sovereigntization to explain non-“security” threat construction and practices mobilized to protect Canadian sovereignty (the referent object). Our particular interest lies in exploring how securitizing and sovereigntizing moves influence the development of policy tools or instruments related to defence, diplomatic engagement, and international law. The interplay between these dynamics cannot be captured by relying on existing theory.

Conclusion

Our in-depth research confirms basic assumptions that, although there is no direct external military threat to Canada’s security in the North, changing geopolitical and physical conditions will generate significant challenges for the Canadian Government in the future. As the circumpolar security environment continues to evolve, interactions between Arctic states, Arctic peoples, and non-Arctic actors are becoming increasingly central to discussions about the future of the region. Concurrently, the changing climate, vast area, dispersed population, and limited infrastructure continue to constrain defence and security activities in the region, while uncertainties about increased maritime accessibility, resource development, and socio-cultural pressures on Northerners necessitate the ongoing need for new analytical models to help frame robust and appropriate national policies. Accordingly, our findings support national efforts to demonstrate sovereignty, enhance security, and integrate whole of government efforts pursuant to the Northern Strategy in ways that bring positive benefits for Northerners wherever possible. Further research will help to identify best practices to manage local, territorial/
provincial, national, circumpolar, and international interests in a practical, sustainable and mutually beneficial manner.

Canadians and citizens of other Arctic states continue to express concern about the future of Arctic security. Through publications, presentations to academics and decision-makers, and media outreach, we continue to engage and shape leading debates about where Canada has been, and should go, in its efforts to balance sovereignty, security, and stewardship agendas. Our monitoring and interpretation of historical and current relationships and practices (based on systematic archival, media, and policy analysis, interviews, and field research) frames our anticipation of future trends. Furthermore, the achievements of the graduate students and post-doctoral fellows demonstrate this project’s effectiveness at facilitating, mentoring, and providing research opportunities for an emerging generation of experts in the social sciences in Canada. Through collaborative efforts with governmental and non-governmental organizations, and in ongoing conversation with Northerners, we are achieving all of our main research objectives and look forward to wrapping up our ambitious research programme in the coming year.

**Acknowledgements**

Thanks, first and foremost, to Arcticnet for its ongoing support to this project. Thanks to the Arctic Security Working Group, Department of National Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development, Public Safety - Yellowknife office, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Joint Task Force (North), Canadian Rangers National Authority, Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups, Canadian embassies in Vienna and Berlin, and Students on Ice. A special thanks to the Canadian Rangers and community members who shared ideas with us. Thanks to the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Chanchlani India Policy Centre, St. Jerome’s University, University of Montreal, and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary for financial and administrative support.

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